An oblivious and robust digital watermarking scheme with a blob-oriented and modular-arithmetic-based spatial-domain mechanism is presented. It is oblivious in the sense that no original image is required for watermark extraction. By a bloboriented and modular-arithmetic-based embedding-extracting mechanism, which slightly and unevenly perturbs the intensities of the pixels within a blob through the entire image except the exact edges and their 3 * 3 neighboring pixels so that the mean intensity of the marked blob equals a preset value, the scheme achieves robustness against JPEG compression, filtering, noise, and scaling in addition to keeping the embedded watermark transparent and tamper-resistant. The uniqueness and the fusion of the watermark before embedding further increase the difficulties of collusion attack. The experimental results demonstrate that such an oblivious scheme is indeed robust and is superior to some existing oblivious schemes with respect to JPEG compression and filtering. C
INTRODUCTION
"As more and more commercial vendors use the network to deliver the multimedia products for profit, the issues about how to protect these information from pirating, masquerading, as well as to claim the ownership rights of these data become inevitable" [1] . Digital watermarking, which permanently and unalterably marks a unique and visually imperceptible signature on a digital media product, enables the owner or distributor not only to claim ownership of the product but also to trace it in the case of illicit dissemination. Since the network distribution of images often involves image processing and noise disturbance, a useful digital watermarking scheme should also be robust against lossy compression, noise, filtering, cropping, and scaling besides keeping the embedded watermark transparent and tamper-resistant.
Many schemes have been devised to embed the watermark onto the image. They manipulate either the luminance values or the gray level of pixels directly, called the spatial-domain approach [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , or the coefficients of the frequencies, called the frequency-or spectrumdomain approach [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] .
Voyatzis and Pitas presented a scheme, called Scheme V&P [7] in this paper, that applies toral automorphisms in transforming the watermark into a noise-like image, which is then superimposed onto the original. Such a method greatly discourages the collusion attack as the watermark becomes some randomly positioned signals after chaotic mixing, which differ in every distribution. However, the noise-like mark, when superimposed onto the edge pixels in the original image, could possibly cause edge sharpening or smoothing and hence magnifies the contrast among the distributed images. In order to minimize the edge contrast standing out among the distributed images, this paper presents a scheme that deliberately avoids casting the mark information onto the edges and their immediate neighboring pixels.
The proposed scheme, called Scheme LIN-O, is an oblivious, transparent, and robust digital watermarking scheme with a blob-oriented and modular-arithmetic-based spatialdomain mechanism. It is oblivious in the sense that no original image is required for watermark extraction [15] ; it is transparent in the sense that the watermarked images are indistinguishable from the original and from each other; and it is robust against noise disturbance, lossy compression, filtering, and cropping, as well as collusion attack because: (1) the owner or distributor can still extract an intelligible watermark from his or her distributed image even if it had been somewhat manipulated, and (2) a reasonably large collection of the distributed images hardly reveals any embedding pattern.
In general, Scheme LIN-O embeds a unique watermark, which comprises a registered company logo for claiming the ownership of the distribution and a unique license number for authenticating the user onto each distribution. The license number will be delivered to the user secretly for his or her proof of legitimacy. The unique watermark is transformed into a bit sequence, called a mark-sequence, before being embedded onto the image to discourage the attackers from tampering, as masquerading the company logo also messes up the license number and hence unauthenticates it. These sequences are embedded onto the pixels in the entire image except the edges and the expanded edges 2 . By avoiding embedding onto the edges, scheme LIN-O prevents the edge sharpening and smoothing effects and thus minimizes the contrast among the watermarked images. In addition, edges contribute to the majority of the high frequency coefficients in the frequency domain, which are often affected by noise, lossy compression, or filtering; thus, when edges for embedding are avoided, extraction robustness against image manipulation is strengthened. Furthermore, if several identical mark-sequences are embedded, majority decoding in the extraction stage is enabled. To prevent the edge block that causes the extracted bitmap to become skewed when some new edges appear after image manipulation from being falsely discarded, the block and the corresponding mark-bit are both skipped if a block is identified as an edge block during mark-bit embedding and extraction. Despite embedding almost all over the image, this scheme neither affects the transparency of the watermark nor degrades the quality of the image, since "it is the edge, not the difference in gray levels, that is perceived" [16] . When embedding a mark-bit, each pixel within a blob is perturbed by a small random amount so that the new mean intensity of the marked blob modulo a predetermined modulus equals a preset value. Notice that the small perturbation of each marked pixel is randomly distributed within a range to result in difference images 3 with irregularly shaped and uneven-luminance blobs, which further increases the difficulty of collusion attack. To verify the embedded signature in a given distributed image without the original, Scheme LIN-O first applies noise filtering and edge sharpening techniques on the watermarked image to locate the edge pixels that are also classified as edge pixels in the original image. It then extracts each mark-bit by comparing the modulated mean intensity of the blob excluding the edge pixels to a range of values. It finalizes the mark-sequence from all the extracted ones and finally authenticates the copy if the signature reveals both the company logo and the license number.
The experimental results demonstrate that Scheme LIN-O is quite robust against various image manipulations such as JPEG compression, median-, mean-, blurring-, and sharpeningfiltering, and noise, as well as multiple-scaling. The scheme is secure against collusion attack in the sense that the probability of locating and tampering with the watermark from a reasonably large collection of different distributions is quite small. It is superior to Scheme V&G with respect to JPEG compression and filtering and is probably as robust to collusion attack, since the difference images from both schemes appear equally random.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, three major mechanisms of the proposed scheme are described: watermark generation, watermark embedding, and watermark extraction and signature verification. In Section 3, the performance of the scheme with respect to robustness against JPEG compression, mean-, median-, blurring-, and sharpening-filtering, and noise, as well as scaling is analyzed. A comparison to Scheme V&P is also conducted in this section. The security issue is investigated in Section 4, and the conclusion is presented in Section 5.
PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed digital watermarking scheme, called Scheme LIN-O, is oblivious in the sense that no original image is required for watermark extraction; transparent, as the watermarked images are, from a human visual perception point of view, indistinguishable from the original and from each other; and robust against noise, cropping, lossy compression, filtering, scaling, and collusion attack. The scheme can best be described through the following three aspects: watermark generation, watermark embedding, and watermark extraction.
Watermark Generation
The aim of this mechanism is to generate a unique watermark for each image to be distributed and to transform the watermark to a bit string before embedding. When the fused form of the watermark is casted, it discourages the attackers from tampering as masquerading the company logo also messes up the license number and hence unauthenticates it. The watermark generation algorithm is as follows.
WATERMARK GENERATION ALGORITHM. Since the watermark is for the owner or distributor to claim the ownership of a distribution and to authenticate the user, it consists of two parts: the registered company logo or trademark and a unique serial number, called license number or user key, that contains the model type and the distribution number. Figure 1 is an example of such a watermark, where AF is the model type, 5309 is the serial number, and the picture design is the company logo.
2. Convert the black and white watermark into a 0/1 mark-sequence from a designated starting location (X, Y ) in a circularly left-right, top-bottom fashion, where 0
For security purposes, the unique watermark is not directly mapped onto the image. Instead, it is converted into a binary bit string, called a mark-sequence, from a starting location Note also that the license number, which also serves as the user key, must be delivered to the user separate from the distribution and securely to prevent it from wiretapping, as it is the sole proof of user legitimacy.
Watermark Embedding
The mark-sequence generated from the watermark is repeatedly embedded onto the entire image except the edges and the expanded edges (i.e., the 3 * 3 neighboring pixels of the edge pixel). The avoidance of embedding onto the edges and their neighbors prevents the edge sharpening and smoothing effects and thus minimizes the contrast among the watermarked images. In addition, edges contribute to the majority of the high frequency coefficients in the frequency domain, which are often compressed during lossy compression; thus, by avoiding edges for embedding, the watermark extraction robustness image manipulation is strengthened. Furthermore, embedding several identical mark-sequences enables majority decoding in the extraction stage. To prevent the edge block that causes the extracted bitmap from become skewed when some new edges appear after image manipulation from being falsely discarded, the block and the corresponding mark-bit are both skipped if a block is determined to be an edge block during mark-bit embedding and extraction. When embedding a mark-bit, each pixel in a variable-sized blob 4 is perturbed by a small random amount so that the mean intensity of the blob modulo a modulus equals a preset value. Such a mechanism provides a large embedding capacity while preserving the transparency of the embedded watermark and the quality of the image, since it is the edge, not the difference in gray levels, that is perceived.
The blob-oriented and modular-arithmetic-based embedding algorithm is described as follows.
WATERMARK EMBEDDING ALGORITHM.
1. Select a positive integer 2 p(≤10) as a modulus. 2. Locate and mark off the edge pixels in the entire image. 3. Mark off also the 3 * 3 neighboring pixels of each edge pixel, called the expanded edges. Figure 2a illustrates both edges and expanded edges.
4. In a left-right, top-down fashion, embed one mark-sequence as follows: (a) Initialize the index of the mark-sequence k to 0. (b) For the kth bit of the mark-sequence m k , get a block b k of 3 × 3 pixels and determine the number of non-marked-off pixels (i.e., the nonedges and nonexpanded edges) n k .
(c) Accept b k as a target blob if n k ≥ 5; else, increment k by 1 and go back to the previous step. Note that both the mark-bit and the rejected block are skipped since the block is identified as an edge block. Note also that b k is called a target blob instead of a target block since its shape may no longer be 3 * 3.
(d) Embed the mark-bit m k onto the target blob b k as follows: i. Label the non-marked-off pixels in b k to P k j , j = 1, . . . , n k (≤ 9), from left to right and top to bottom, as shown in Fig. 2b .
ii. Rearrange P k j , j = 1, . . . , n 
, and set c µ k according to the rules below so that the new intensity of the blob b k modulo 2 p becomes p/2 for m k = 0 and 3 p/2 for m k = 1.
where µ k is the average intensity of the n k pixels in b k , c µ k is the average variation of the intensity to be made in b k , and m k is the kth bit of the mark-sequence. iv. Embed one mark-bit m k onto each unmarked pixel P k j of target blob b k by modifying its intensity v k j according to
This step randomly perturbs the non-edge and non-expanded-edge pixels to prevent the colluding attackers from knowing exactly how the pixels are modified while keeping the change of the blob's mean intensity to be c µ k . (e) Increment k by 1 and go back to Step 4(b) until one mark-sequence is done. 5. Repeat one mark-sequence embedding step for the rest of the image.
Watermark Extraction and Signature Verification
Since the scheme is oblivious, no original is required for watermark extraction; the user key, however, is needed. To prevent the extracted bitmap from becoming skewed when the edges of the test image do not exactly match those of the original due to image manipulation, the scheme uses two measures: (1) apply the noise filter to the test image to reduce those new edges, and (2) skip both the edge block and the corresponding mark-bit during both embedding and extracting. Since the scheme assumes the test images are registered and synchronized, the test images must be restored to the correct size by scaling back, which is required for the scaling-attacked image. The algorithm for extracting the mark-sequence, reconstructing the watermark, and verifying the ownership follows.
WATERMARK EXTRACTION AND SIGNATURE VERIFICATION ALGORITHM.
1. Extract all mark-sequences embedded onto the image as follows:
(a) Obtain the watermark from the database according to the user key.
(b) Apply the noise filtering to image I' and obtain the edge image by using Paintshop Pro software. The noise filtering step removes extra edges caused by noise, compression, or filtering.
(c) Find the histogram of the edge image and set the appropriate threshold to obtain the edge pixel locations {E}. This step restores some true edges which are lost in the noise filtering step.
(d) Expand {E} to {E } by including the eight locations in the 3 * 3 neighborhood of each edge pixel.
(e) Initialize the total count of the embedded mark-sequence MS to 0.
(f) In a left-right, top-down fashion, extract one mark-sequence as follows: i. Initialize the index of the mark-sequence k to 0. ii. To extract the kth bit of the mark-sequence m k , get a block b k of 3 × 3 pixels and determine the number of non-edge and non-expanded-edge pixels n k by checking how many pixel locations are not ∈ {E }.
iii. Accept b k as a target blob if n k ≥ 5; else, increment k by 1 and go back to the previous step. Note that this step skips both mark-bit and the corresponding block; thus, the extracted mark-sequence will only miss those skipped bits instead of becoming skew. C. Set
v. Increment k by 1 and go back to one mark-bit extraction until one marksequence is completely extracted. Increment MS by 1.
g. Repeat the mark-sequence-extracting step until all the embedded mark-sequences are extracted.
2. Finalize the mark-sequence by setting
where m k is the kth bit of the final mark-sequence, m • Manually: Visually inspect the reconstructed watermark. If both the company logo or trademark and the license number appear, declare the usage legitimate when the license number matches the user key; else, declare the usage illicit.
• Automatically: Correlate the reconstructed watermark with the embedded one pixel by pixel. Declare the usage legitimate if the rate is >75%.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Experiments
The watermark, as shown in Fig. 1 , is first converted into a mark-sequence according to the procedure described in Section 2.1. Three still images Lena, F-16, and Town, shown in Figs. 3a-3c, are embedded with the watermark as shown in Fig. 1 using the modulus 2 p = 10, 8, respectively; the marked images are shown in Figs. 4a-4f . The following four tests are then conducted to measure the robustness of this scheme against compression, filtering, scaling, and noisy, as well as cropping. 5 • Test against compression: Six marked images are compressed by JPEG at levels 20 and 50, respectively. The compressed marked images are then used for watermark extraction. • Test against noise: Six marked images are added in 8 and 11% random noise, respectively. The noise marked images are used to extract the embedded watermark.
• Test against filtering: Six marked images are passed through 3 × 3 median-, mean-, blurring-, and sharpening-filtering respectively. The filtered marked images are then used for watermark extraction.
• Test against scaling: Six marked images are scaled up and down by 200 and 150% in each dimension, respectively. The scaled images are used for watermark extraction.
Results and Evaluations
The experimental results can be evaluated from the following aspects:
• Transparency: Comparing Figs. 4a-4f with Figs. 3a-3c , we can hardly differentiate each set of images visually without magnification. In other words, using either modulus 10 or 8, the embedded watermark is not perceivable, for the average perturbation of each pixel is approximately ±5 or ±4 gray levels, respectively.
If we consider the embedded watermark as the noise and the marked image as the signal, then the signal to noise ratio (SNR) for the images as shown in Figs. 4a-4f are 33.1, 36.2, 36.4, 39.4, 33.3, and 36.4, respectively. Thus, the image degradation due to watermarking is, in fact, not significant at all when using modulus 10 or 8.
• Watermark extractability: Figures 5a-5j depict the reconstructed watermarks from the watermarked Lena, as shown in Fig. 4a , going through each of the four tests described above, respectively, whereas Table I lists the rates of correlation of the extracted and the embedded watermarks for all six marked images. The results show that the reconstructed watermarks from all six marked images are: (1) 100% intelligible and above 90% numerically correlated for JPEG compression even as large as level 50; (2) 100% intelligible and above 85% numerically correlated for median-, mean-, blurring-, and sharpening-filtering except for image Town, modulus 8; and (3) 100% intelligible and above 98% numerically correlated for SNR equal to 17 and above. As for the scaling effect, scaling 2× in each dimension does not affect the intelligibility of the extracted watermarks from both marked images, whereas scaling 1.5× degrades quite a lot for image Town.
The results clearly demonstrate the scheme is quite robust on most images after manipulations such as JPEG compression, and median-, mean-, blurring-, and sharpeningfiltering, as well as random noise. However, it is not quite as robust for very busy but not sharp edge images such as Town, since such images contain too many edges that are either deliberately skipped when embedding the mark-bit or susceptible to image manipulations.
Comparison
The performance of Scheme LIN-O is compared to that of Scheme V&G in [7] using three aspects: (1) embedding capacity, (2) robustness against image manipulation, and (3) obliviousness. All tests are conducted using the same original images of Lena and a logo (Playboy Bunny of size 51 × 51 pixels).
• Embedding capacity: The number of pixels used to carry the mark information for Scheme LIN-O depends on how busy the image is, whereas this is not the case in Scheme V&G. However, both Scheme LIN-O and Scheme V&P can embed nine Bunnies in the test image. In general, the embedding capacity of Scheme LIN-O is approximately on the order 20,000-23,000 for an image of size 512 × 512 pixels.
• Robustness against image processing and noise: The reconstructed watermarks from three tests against a JPEG 14 : 1 ratio, mean filtering, and median filtering for Scheme LIN-O are shown in Figs. 6a-6f with correlation rate 0.97, 0.99, and 0.99 for modulus 10 and 0.87, 0.95, and 0.98 for modulus 8, respectively, whereas the simulated correlation rates using Scheme V&G, as shown in Figs. 6g-6i , are approximately 0.61, 0.83, and 0.88. 6 Therefore, it is obvious that Scheme LIN-O is much more robust against both JPEG compression and JPEG filtering.
• Obliviousness: Both Scheme LIN-O and Scheme V&G are oblivious, as both do not require the original image for watermark extraction.
SECURITY
When the statement "The conjecture in the literature that 8-10 copies may be sufficient for a collusion attack to Cox et al.'s scheme" from Memon and Wong [15] is taken into account, Scheme LIN-O is definitely stronger in security. When Scheme LIN-O is compared to Scheme V&G, it is probably as secure. Furthermore, the scheme is secure from both of the following attacks:
• Two colluding attackers cannot recover the original by simply averaging two distributions. From Step 4 of watermark embedding, we see that the pixels within a target blob are randomly permuted and then perturbed so that the intensities of the marked pixels, which are embedded with bit 0 or 1 in two different distributions, vary randomly also. Figures 7a-7d illustrate a block of 3 * 3 pixels embedded with either bit 1 or 0 using scheme LIN-O and modulus 8. It is clear that the averaging block embedded with both 1s does not result in a new block better resembling the original than the single block alone, as shown in Fig. 7e ; the averaging block embedded with one 1, one 0, as shown in Fig. 7f , however, appears to better resemble the original. Nevertheless, the watermark is unique for each distribution (10 4 for each type of distribution if a four-digit license number is used) and is transformed before being embedded (48 * 48 total transformations for a watermark of size 48 * 48), so the probability that the bit patterns of two mark-sequences happen to complement each other is very slim. Therefore, averaging two distributions cannot result in the original. Figures 8a and 8b show the experimental result, where Fig. 8a is an average of the two marked Lena images and Fig. 8b is the difference between the original Lena image and the averaged Lena image.
• Two colluding attackers cannot reveal the embedded mark-sequence from the difference image of the two distributions. From Eqs. (1) and (2), we see that perturbations of the marked pixels are randomly distributed within −( p + 2) to p + 2. Thus the intensities of the embedded pixels in the difference image also vary randomly such that the shapes of the marked blobs become very irregular and the intensities of the pixels in each blob are uneven as well. If we assume that (1) the colluding attackers believe that a pixel with nonzero intensity in the difference images is a marked pixel, and (2) a blob of identical nonzero intensity in a difference image reveals some embedding patterns (e.g., the whole blob is only embedded with one bit), then the colluding attackers cannot be sure that the embedding is blob-oriented since the difference image reveals no blob pattern. Figures 8c  and 8d clearly show this point, where Fig. 8c is the difference between two marked Lena images and Fig. 8d is one portion of Fig. 8c enlarged.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I present an oblivious spatial-domain watermarking scheme that includes a mechanism to generate a unique watermark for each distribution and to transform it before embedding and a blob-oriented, modular-arithmetic-based mechanism to embed or extract the mark-sequences onto or from a gray-level image. The experimental results show that this scheme definitely achieves the transparency of the embedded watermark due to small intensity perturbations of the marked pixels (i.e., at most ten gray levels with an average of five) and the fact that no single edge pixel is marked. The results also demonstrate that the scheme is very robust against JPEG compression, median-, mean-, blurring, and sharpeningfiltering, and noise, as well as scaling, with JPEG compression the most robust and noninteger-multiple scaling the least. The scheme is secure against collusion attack in the sense that the probability of locating and tampering with the watermark from a reasonably large collection of different distributions is extremely small. When the performance of Voyatzis and Pitas's scheme [7] is compared, the experimental results show that my scheme is much more robust against JPEG compression and filtering and is probably as secure since the collection of difference images from both schemes appears equally random. Issues of multiple watermarking and attack by geometrical transform such as synchronization and rotation are currently under investigation.
